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Abstract 
 
What affects lobbying patterns in trade policymaking? Existing explanations focus mainly on 
economic determinants, like the rise of intra-industry trade. We argue that the international trade 
institutions of the WTO themselves are also key for understanding which type of interest 
mobilization is likely to arise. We contend that the institutional setting of issue-linkage based 
trade negotiations creates incentives for firms to work through broad sector-wide lobbying 
organizations, while judicial adjudication and enforcement in WTO dispute settlement 
stimulates de-linkage, leading to product-specific interest mobilization. We illustrate how these 
two arguments can explain the co-existence of both sector-wide and product-specific lobbying 
in the contemporary international trade regime. We provide evidence on interest mobilization 
for US and EU initiated WTO disputes, and on EU and US domestic interest organizations that 
mobilize during multilateral trade rounds or are present at WTO ministerial conferences. 
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Introduction 
An important question in the study of trade politics relates to the way collective 
action is structured. Such question is important because the nature of collective action 
has profound effects on the effectiveness and outcomes of political decision-making. To 
give one notable example, Mancur Olson argued that an all too steep increase of 
specialized lobbying could lead to deadlock in political decision-making.
2
 Existing 
explanations for the aggregation and representation of interests in trade politics usually 
concentrate on domestic political cleavages along factors of production, sectors of 
industry, or specific products. For instance, in recent years studies that focus on industry 
collective action have argued that trade politics is characterized much more by product-
specific lobbying than sector-wide and cross-sector lobbying and that this is due to the 
growing importance of intra-industry trade in contemporary international trade 
relations.
3
  
In this article, we argue that the design of international trade institutions also 
shapes the character of interest mobilization in trade policy lobbying. We do not seek to 
the refute analyses that stress the importance of domestic factors but rather to 
complement these works in showing how international institutions can also affect the 
dynamics of collective action in trade policy making. Our reasoning builds on earlier 
research showing how international institutions has affected various other aspects of 
international trade politics, such as multilateral trade negotiations,
4
 and compliance with 
multilateral trade rules.
5
 Likewise, we argue that the institutional characteristics of the 
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international trade regime could also affect the nature of collective action in domestic 
politics.  
Our main argument is that the bifurcated structure of the international trade 
regime with both a judicial and a negotiation venue leads to the co-existence of different 
types of interest group mobilization within the regime. First, we submit that judicial 
adjudication and enforcement in the WTO dispute settlement system de-links issues and 
stimulates product-specific lobbying. Exporters know that WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body rulings, and the possibility of trade sanctions, increases the likelihood that a 
foreign government will remove non-WTO-conform trade barriers. The case-by-case 
logic of judicial proceedings triggers product-specific interests to lobby their 
government, and makes them less eager to pay the high coordination costs of sector-
wide collective action. Second, we submit that the institutional setting of issue-linkage 
based multilateral trade negotiations create incentives for firms to lobby through 
organizations that represent and aggregate the interests of entire industry sectors, or 
even across multiple sectors. In such a context, fruitful lobbying depends on the ability 
to supply the building blocks for across-issue package deals that negotiators will 
generally seek to attain. Since the probability that a single firm’s lobbying effort affects 
outcomes is likely to increase when mobilization takes place in cross-sector business 
alliances and/or sector peak associations, individual firms will seek to represent their 
interests through such more encompassing interest organizations. 
Our analysis has several implications for the literatures on trade policy, interest 
groups, and global governance. First, we complement existing accounts on trade policy 
lobbying by specifying how international trade institutions influence firm incentives for 
political mobilization. Second, we add to the literature on patterns of interest group 
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articulation in domestic governance in advanced liberal democracies.
6
 Our analysis 
shows that the institutional structure of international trade governance, constituted as it 
is by a highly judicialized form of adjudication and recurrent multilateral trade 
negotiations, may have systematic consequences for patterns of political mobilization. 
Third, we highlight some potential future developments in patterns of interest 
representation in global trade governance. The decline of the WTO as a forum for 
negotiated trade liberalization combined with the continued resilience of the 
organization’s judicial arm, raises the expectation that the current structure of interest 
representation at the WTO will shift to a more imbalanced structure, in which narrower 
interests primarily determine the content of WTO commitments.  
The article is structured as follows. We first explore the strength of existing 
explanations regarding the character of interest mobilization on international trade. We 
then present our argument on the differential effects of two types of institutions in the 
world trade regime: the WTO’s negotiation forum and its judicial arm. We go on to 
show the plausibility of our argument by presenting data on how the WTO provides 
varying incentive structure for collective action in the US and in the EU. We conclude 
with a description of the consequences of our findings and provide some suggestions for 
future research.  
 
Existing literature 
Discussions on the nature of interest representation in trade policy lobbying have 
often focused on why economic sectors or producers of particular products organize 
collectively. Two models from these discussions need careful consideration here: the 
sector model and the intra-industry model. Although originally these models were 
designed to predict the effects of international trade policies on economic welfare, they 
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also make predictions regarding political cleavages and patterns in political 
representation.
7
 
The sector or Ricardo-Viner model assumes that production factors are sector-
specific. Trade liberalization increases the returns from the abundant factors used in that 
sector, while it reduces returns from the scarce factors used in that sector.
8
 Under such 
circumstances, firms are likely to organize in sector-wide trade associations to defend 
their interests on international trade.  
The intra-industry model comes from strategic trade theory, and assumes 
economies of scale and imperfect competition. If firms benefit from increasing returns 
to scale, barriers to entry for new firms go up, and established firms find themselves in a 
situation of imperfect competition. This results in intra-industry trade, i.e. trade of 
different varieties of the same product between countries with similar factor 
endowments.
9
 Due to extensive product differentiation and specialization, intra-industry 
trade turns firms or agglomerations of firms into the dominant actors in their market 
niche.  
Observing that intra-industry trade reduces the costs of trade relative to inter-
industry trade, a number of analyses have argued that intra-industry trade lowers the 
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incentives for more collective forms of representation (and may even make trade 
liberalization politically easier to achieve).
10
 Other authors have, however, pointed out 
that strategic trade theory tends to overlook how intra-industry trade affects incentives 
for collective action.
11
 While the costs of adjusting to intra-industry trade are probably 
less severe than with inter-industry, comparative advantage trade, they are not 
concentrated in one single social class or a single industry. Rather, a small set of hyper-
specialized producers, or even a single firm, face the burden. Because firms consider the 
expected benefits and costs of lobbying, as well as the likelihood that their individual 
and joint efforts will have an impact on policy outcomes,
12
 intra-industry trade is 
expected to ease political mobilization. The decreasing number of firms in markets with 
intra-industry trade increases the impact one single firm may have on policy outcomes 
and lowers the coordination costs for collective action. Michael Gilligan went so far as 
to state that the high concentration of benefits and the low coordination costs might turn 
lobbying over intra-industry trade into a private, rather than a public good for the firms 
active in that product category within a country.
13
 Because intra-industry trade leads 
firms to act more individually or in small groups (rather than collectively within or 
across sectors), trade policy lobbying will take the shape of highly specialized and 
brand-specific associations dominated by a small number of firms.  
In our view, taking into account how the institutional characteristics of the 
international trade regime also affect patterns of interest mobilization in trade policy can 
fruitfully complement these seminal contributions. Although the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the WTO underwent a significant reform in 1995, the existing studies on 
the effect of intra-industry trade on the character of trade policy lobbying neglect the 
impact of this important institutional innovation on trade policy lobbying. For instance, 
Gilligan considers evidence on trade complaints lodged at the US International Trade 
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Commission by American interest groups in the 1988–1994 period, and Kim offers 
evidence on trade policy lobbying based on the reports that became available only after 
the adoption of the Lobbying Disclosure Act in 1995;
14
 yet, both studies does not 
control for how changes in the institutional set-up of the WTO affect trade policy 
lobbying.  
Yet, as former studies have shown, international institutions have a profound on 
other aspects of trade politics, including how issue-linkage increases the likelihood of 
liberalization, how the rising importance of the judicial arm of the WTO affects the 
balance between exporters and import-competing groups in the domestic political arena, 
and how the strength of the WTO’s enforcement capacity is a critical factor influencing 
a state’s propensity both to subject itself to further commitments and to comply with 
already agreed upon rules.
15
 In line with these studies, we suggest that international 
institutions may also have a critical influence the politics underlying trade policy 
making. More specifically, we contend that international institutions can crucially affect 
the nature of collective action. 
 
International trade institutions and trade policy lobbying 
As in studies on interest group politics and social movements, we conceive of 
the institutional environment as a political opportunity structure,
16
 and dissatisfaction 
with, or threats to, the preferred status-quo emanating from public policymaking can be 
regarded as determining and shaping the supply of lobbying efforts.
17
 In line with such a 
conceptualization of lobbying, we argue that differences in the design of institutions—
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that is, in their mandate and functioning—affect the type of interests that get mobilized, 
as specific institutional features affect the scope of the policy issues being treated within 
them. While some institutions are structured to deal with a broad and encompassing sets 
of issues, other institutions, by design, deal with highly specific issues and consider 
each issue on its own merits. This institutional distinctiveness affects the organizational 
form of interest aggregation and representation.  
From this perspective, a variety of analyses have emphasized how in the 
domestic realm the different institutional contexts of rule generation and law making on 
the one hand, and of rule application and enforcement on the other hand, call for 
different, yet co-existing, forms of interest mobilization. In the former case, interests 
tend to be represented through encompassing organizations, while in the latter case 
special and narrow interests, but often also individuals or individual firms, dominate the 
scene.
18
 We expect a similar logic to play out in the WTO as both a legislative and a 
judicial venue also coexist within it. The existing literature on the relationship between 
institutions and political mobilization in trade policy has, however, hitherto focused 
only on differences across domestic institutions.
19
 Incentives to lobby, however, do not 
only vary in this way across domestic political institutions. Varying political 
opportunity structures within international institutions can also provide distinct 
incentive structures that shape interest aggregation. In the global trade regime we see 
especially two types of political opportunity structures, which provide contradictive 
incentives for collective action: the Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the WTO trade 
negotiation forum, the Ministerial Conferences.     
 
Judicial adjudication and enforcement  
From the inception of the GATT in 1947 onwards, the structure of reciprocal 
concessions in multilateral trade rounds has generally been the cornerstone of the 
                                                          
18
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international trade regime, whereas the regime’s enforcement mechanism only became 
highly judicialized since the creation of the WTO in 1995.
20
 The WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM) consists of automatic, independent, and binding third 
party adjudication, backed by the possibility of multilaterally authorized trade sanctions. 
The adjudication of members’ complaints is thus multilateral, while enforcement is 
bilateral. The automatic right to review, the formulation of legally binding obligations, a 
standing tribunal of justices, and the authority to authorize sanctions and even cross-
retaliation against recalcitrant WTO members, make the WTO’s judicial arm a highly, 
and perhaps the world’s most judicialized global institution.21 
Such an international judicial institution is likely to set incentives for product 
specific trade policy lobbying. Since WTO litigation is a bilateral, single-issue 
interaction, judicial institutions de-link different issues.
22
 This institutional context 
incentivizes exporters active in a particular product niche to organize interest 
representation on that level, to push their public authorities to investigate their issue-
specific demands, and to file the case with the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM), which applies general, previously agreed on rules case by case.  
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Strategic issue linkages in this judicial context are difficult for a number of 
reasons. First, government representatives are generally not granted the authority to 
make commitments on issues other than the one under dispute. Second, the most 
favored nation obligation makes such linkages particularly costly, as any concession 
beyond the disputed issue would have to be automatically extended in a non-
discriminatory way to all other WTO members. And third, traditionally global trade 
diplomacy avoids compensating for losses in the form of direct cash payments. All 
these features make it difficult to engage in issue linkage within a WTO dispute.
23
 
The de-linkage of issues brought about by this judicial environment decreases 
the need for firms to lobby through sector-wide or cross-sector associations, and 
stimulates them to lobby through product-specific associations. Since working through 
large encompassing organizations will not increase the probability that an individual 
firm’s lobbying is going to contribute to a successful outcome, exporting firms seeking 
trade benefits are more likely to lobby only on the issues of importance to their 
companies, independently from other producers or sectors. 
Three further characteristics of this highly judicialized institutional environment 
create disincentives to use sector-wide organizations. First, panel decisions and 
Appellate Body reports are not formally binding in the sense of the common law 
doctrine of precedent. Absent formally binding legal precedent, the benefits stemming 
from a WTO ruling can only be appropriated by the firms active in the product category 
affected by the dispute.
24
 If there consistently were formally binding legal precedent 
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instead, firms active in different product markets or sectors not directly affected by a 
dispute, but potentially affected by future disputes concerning the same WTO rule, 
could have incentives to engage in anticipatory collective action beyond their particular 
product category. Second, product-specific trade associations do not need to balance 
diverging membership interests, but can concentrate on compiling the detailed, product-
specific information and frame this in a highly specialized legal language that resonates 
well in a judicial venue. Third, the removal or the maintenance of trade barriers has 
direct effects on the economic success of specific firms, as one year without access to 
large consumer markets often has immediate consequences for the balance sheet. In 
order to maximize the effectiveness of lobbying efforts, such firms prefer to avoid 
lengthy sector-wide or cross-sector policy coordination, if the institutional route to do so 
is available.  
It is important to note that some analyses have already shown how the 
judicialization of the DSM has transformed traditional forms of lobbying into public-
private partnerships characterized by horizontal, network-like exchanges based on 
expertise, learning, and information give-and-take.
25
 We add that judicialization does 
not only affect the way private actors and public officials interact, but could also alter 
the nature of interest representation.  
 
Negotiations  
The DSM thus provides incentives for specialized forms of lobbying. In contrast, 
during trade negotiations, executive officials purposely link issues. The more trade 
negotiators broaden the stakes of ongoing negotiations, the more market access they can 
obtain from foreign trading partners, while counteracting domestic obstacles to 
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25 Gregory Shaffer, Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in W.T.O. Litigation. Washington 
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liberalization.
26
 Moreover, the heterogeneity of capabilities and preference intensities 
among WTO members enhances the chances for cooperation through issue linkage, and 
the decision-rule of unanimity further enhances demand for issue linkage from states 
wishing to change the status quo.
27
  
An institutional context of trade negotiations based on issue linkage is likely to 
generate a demand for encompassing and aggregated interests. When negotiators 
assemble package deals on multiple issues, the credibility of their liberalization 
demands, as well as of their offers of concessions, depends on their domestic support. 
To put it in two-level game language, the size of negotiators’ win-sets decreases and 
their bargaining power increases when exporters express strong demands and import-
competing sectors draw clear red lines.
28
 Negotiators wanting to bring home an 
agreement thus have an incentive to enlarge their win-set by offering concessions in 
other domains through linking issues. To be successful in this exercise, negotiators rely 
on key interlocutors from private industry that are able to deliver stable and credible 
positions.  
Therefore, if business representatives want to obtain liberalization benefits or to 
protect their domestic market by opposing particular concessions, they need coordinated 
positions. Umbrella associations constitute the best organizational form within which 
economic sectors can aggregate their preferences, with positions likely to be determined 
by the preferences of their largest members or those with the strongest preferences over 
issues, which they then transmit to their government representatives and negotiators.
29
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Business actors, in other words, have an incentive to aggregate interests in order to 
weigh credibly on this negotiation process characterized by institutionalized issue 
linkage.
30
 These complex institutionalized issue linkages make product-specific or firm-
level lobbying less effective, as sector-wide and cross-sector peak associations are better 
equipped to follow all parts of the negotiations, provide aggregated policy positions for 
negotiators, and can weigh more decisively on negotiation outcomes. Moreover, since 
trade negotiators face constraints on time, resources, and agenda space,
31
 and since there 
are transaction costs associated with interactions with interest groups, societal interests 
are likely to aggregate their interests on the level of entire sectors of industry.    
In short, we contend that the WTO provides two contrasting incentive structures 
for interest mobilization. First, the DSM triggers product-specific collective action. 
Second, the Ministerial Conference (MC) negotiations create incentives for sector-wide 
or cross-sector collective action.  
 
Evidence  
To see whether our reasoning is plausible we look at the incentives provided by 
the DSM and the MCs in two economic regions in the world: the US and the EU. We 
opted for these regions because they are pivotal players in international trade relations, 
accounting for roughly 40 per cent of world trade, and because they are the most 
frequent users of the WTO dispute settlement system.
32
 Second, the strong involvement 
of both the US and the EU in intra-industry trade makes us confident that we do not 
design our research in favor of our own expectations. Our evidence concerning the US 
and the EU allows us to assess the proposition that the institutional design of the global 
trade regime affects the organizational form of collective action. Third, it is generally 
recognized that the EU and the US differ significantly in their domestic institutions, 
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which in turn affects the predominant mode of interest representation on both sides of 
the Atlantic.
33
 While the prevailing consensus oriented decision making institutions in 
the EU coincide with a corporatist domestic mode of interest representation in many of 
its member states, the majoritarian US institutions are characterized by a pluralist 
interest group environment. These strong differences domestically give extra leverage to 
our findings. In the remainder of this paper, we provide illustrative evidence indicating 
the different incentives that the WTO provides for domestic interest mobilization.  
 
Judicial adjudication and enforcement of trade rules  
We first analyze the effect of the institutional structure of the WTO’s judicial 
arm on interest mobilization, by looking at the product coverage of all GATT/WTO 
dispute settlement cases lodged by the EU and the US. Ideally, we of course would have 
used data on lobbying in domestic institutional contexts, but unfortunately such data, 
which would allow for a comparison between the US and the EU, is not available. 
Various scholars have indeed investigated the nature and size of US trade policy 
lobbying coalitions, by looking at official data on interest group testimonies to the 
Senate Finance Committee,
34
 trade complaints lodged at the International Trade 
Commission,
35
 trade lobbying expenditures from the US Senate Office of Public 
Records,
36
 and congressional votes on trade policy bills.
37
 Yet, we lack similar and 
comparable sources on trade policy lobbying in the EU context. For one, data on 
interest group spending are not systematically collected, and direct campaign 
contributions by firms are forbidden in most EU member states. Additionally, 
institutional mechanisms to formally and publicly collect trade complaints have only 
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been in place since 1995.
38
 Finally, while evidence from US Section 301 and EU Trade 
Barrier Regulation market access investigations for WTO dispute settlement cases is 
available and actually confirms the predominance of the product-specific lobbying 
origin for such cases, the data only consists of cases that were brought publicly, and 
leaves out the large majority of WTO dispute settlement cases where firms and interest 
groups value confidentiality.  
Although imperfect, the scope of WTO dispute settlements provides a good 
indication for the type of incentives the DSM provides for collective action. To see what 
types of cases are filed during the GATT and WTO period, we analyze the product 
scope of the cases filed. To measure the product scope of disputes at both the GATT 
and the WTO, we coded all EU and US disputes (282 cases) according to the ISIC 
(International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities) 
classification system. Whenever the US or the EU were both complainants in a dispute, 
we treated them as distinct cases, as we are interested in capturing the type of lobbying 
that triggered the public authorities to file a complaint in both political systems. 
Moreover, to investigate whether the increase in intra-industry trade accounts for 
changes in the type of product coverage seen in dispute settlement cases over time, we 
also included the relation between the level of interest aggregation in the framework of 
GATT and WTO dispute settlement and the evolution of intra-industry trade in the EU 
and the US over the same period.
39
 This way we can somewhat ‘control’ for the 
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where 𝑋𝑎𝑏,𝑖 represents a’s exports to trading partner b in industry i, and 𝑀𝑎𝑏,𝑖 represents a’s imports from 
b in industry i. This measure takes a value between zero and one, and is increasing in the share of intra-
industry trade. To calculate intra-industry trade for the EU, we aggregate across all EU member states, 
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structure of trade flows, i.e. existing explanations that do not consider the potential 
effects of international institutions.  
 
Figure 1a – Percentage of product-level DS cases  
and intra-industry trade in the EU (1962-2008) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
excluding intra-EU trade. We calculate intra-industry trade for the EU and the US using two different data 
sets: Robert Feenstra, Robert Lipsey, Haiyan Deng, Alyson Ma, and Hengyong Mo, ‘World Trade Flows 
1962-2000’, NBER Working Paper no. 11040, 2005, contains all commodity-level bilateral trade flows 
between 1962 and 2000, while the UN COMTRADE dataset employed by Leonardo Baccini, Andreas 
Dür and Manfred Elsig, ‘The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: The Obligation-Flexibility Tradeoff’, 
Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Antwerp, April 10-15, 2012, provides data on 
commodity-level bilateral trade from 1989-2009. To ensure compatibility between the two data sets, we 
aggregate the Feenstra et al. data to the two-digit SITC code format.  
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Figure 1b – Percentage of product-level DS cases  
and intra-industry trade in the US (1962-2008) 
 
 
 
Figure 1a and 1b plot the evolution of intra-industry trade as a percentage of 
total trade, and the development of product level cases filed as a share of all cases that 
were filed during the GATT period in the EU and the US. With regard to the dispute 
settlement cases, due to the low number of cases in some periods, especially in the 
1960s and 1970s, we used a moving average of cases over a period of 10 years.
40
 The 
figures show that increases in the share of product-level cases filed with the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism do not move in line with the changing composition of EU 
and US trade. While in the pre-1995 period, product-level lobbying and intra-industry 
trade seem to go fairly hand in hand, the growth trends in their relative share of total 
lobbying and total trade, respectively, diverge in the subsequent period for both the EU 
and the US.  
In the case of EU trade with the rest of the world, the share of intra-industry 
trade increased from around 30 percent in the early 1980s to near 50 percent in the mid 
                                                          
40
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and late 1990s. The average number of product-level dispute settlement cases filed by 
the EU also grows in this period at a rather consistent rate (that is, from around 35 
percent in the early 1980s to about 55 percent in the mid 1990s). However, in the period 
after the creation of the WTO, the share of intra-industry trade as a percentage of total 
trade actually decreased over time, whereas the share of product-level dispute settlement 
cases increased considerably. In the late 2000s, the average share of product-level cases 
exceeded 80 percent of all WTO dispute settlement cases filed by the EU, while the 
share of intra-industry trade dropped to less than 45 percent of total EU trade in the 
same period.  
The US displays a very similar pattern. As portrayed in figure 1b, the share of 
dispute settlement cases filed and the share of intra-industry trade increased rather 
consistently during the GATT period, whereas this is not the case for the period after 
the creation of the WTO. Between 1980 and 1995, US intra-industry trade grew from a 
share of 28 to almost 50 percent of total US trade. Likewise, the average share of 
product level dispute settlement cases increased from less than 40 percent to almost 60 
percent. After the creation of the WTO, however, the share of product-level cases rose 
to almost 80 percent of all WTO dispute settlement cases filed by the US, whereas the 
level of intra-industry trade actually dropped with a few percentage points, from around 
50 percent to close to 45 percent of total US trade in the mid and late 2000s.  
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Table 1 – Percentage of sector-wide and product-specific EU and US dispute 
settlement cases in GATT and WTO period 
 
 Product Sector Cramer’s V 
Overall 
    GATT (N=115) 
    WTO (N=170) 
 
53 
79 
 
47 
21 
 
.272 
(p=.000) 
European Union 
   GATT (N=41) 
   WTO (N=83) 
 
56 
82 
 
43 
18 
 
0.275  
(p=.002) 
United States 
   GATT (N=74) 
   WTO (N=87) 
 
51 
76 
 
49 
24 
 
0.255  
(p=.001) 
 
The contrast is even starker when we compare the entire GATT period with the 
WTO period (see table 1). If we look at the average shares of product and sector level 
cases filed in both periods, we see that the average share of product-level cases 
increased from 53 percent of all dispute settlement cases in the GATT period to 79 
percent in the WTO period. For the EU, product-specific dispute settlement cases 
increased from an average share of 56 percent in the GATT period, to no less than 82 
percent in the WTO period. In the US, the share of product-specific complaints 
increased from an average of 51 percent in the GATT period, to an average of 76 
percent in the WTO period. Given that the share of intra-industry trade in both the EU 
and the US did not increase in the WTO period, and even decreased a bit, it is clear that 
intra-industry trade (alone) cannot account for the increase of product level dispute 
settlement cases, but that the institutional environment of more judicialized adjudication 
and enforcement contributed to this specialization of interest mobilization.  
  
Negotiation of trade rules  
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In order to examine the extent to which the institutional setting of multilateral 
trade negotiations provides incentives for firms to mobilize through sector-wide and 
cross-sector lobbying organizations, we first present qualitative evidence on the 
different GATT negotiation rounds. Over the course of decades, the GATT negotiation 
rounds led to reciprocal liberalization in a host of economic sectors, such as the 
machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural sectors. Throughout the first 
five GATT rounds, countries negotiated on an item-by-item, request-offer approach, 
and linked these in packages that seemed balanced to all.
41
 The exact form of this basic 
structure of reciprocal liberalization commitments, also called exchanges of 
concessions, was changed somewhat later on from tariff reductions to linear tariff cuts 
in the Kennedy Round (1963–67), and to a harmonization approach in the Tokyo Round 
(1973–79; reducing tariff peaks more) amended by lists of exceptions (such as in the 
agricultural or textiles sectors). Next to the exchange of tariff concessions, negotiations 
covered rules governing the conduct of domestic anti-dumping investigations, whether 
or not to include negotiations on foreign direct investment, the institutional design of 
the DSM, intellectual property protection, technical barriers to trade, and so on. The 
gradual worldwide lowering of tariff-barriers corresponded with the increasing 
importance of non-tariff trade barriers or so-called behind-the-border issues.  
Let us now turn to the qualitative evidence from these GATT rounds, which 
seem to confirm that these negotiations set institutional incentives for interest 
mobilization through sector-wide and cross-sector lobbying. During the Kennedy 
Round, sector-wide agricultural organizations from the US insisted on the inclusion of 
agriculture in the round, whereas the European agricultural sector insisted, successfully, 
on keeping their sector outside of the liberalization package.
42
 Also, sector-wide trade 
associations for aluminium, ceramics, coal, electrical, and glass products, as well as 
producers in the car industry and mechanical manufacturing, textiles, agriculture, 
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chemicals, and commercial services sectors actively mobilized in favor of increased 
market access on the American market.
43
  
Next, during the Uruguay Round, sector-wide peak associations were the 
governments’ main interlocutors in the sectors of agriculture and manufactured goods.44 
In Europe, for example, sector-wide trade associations formulated positions and 
communicated these to the European Commission’s negotiators, including the European 
Chemical Industry Council, the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations, and the European Automobile Manufacturers Association. Encompassing, 
cross-sector trade associations such as the Union of Industrial and Employers’ 
Confederations of Europe (UNICE; now called BusinessEurope), the European 
Roundtable of Industrialists, and the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels also 
acted as important interlocutors of European Commission negotiators.
45
 The European 
Commission even actively summoned economic sectors to bring to bear their demands 
through sector-wide and cross-sector groups, in order to have a representative overview 
of the demands and a common thread running through them, which could be brought to 
the negotiation table.
46
 It was also the sector-wide European Chemical Industry Council 
CEFIC that, together with their American and Japanese counterparts, initiated the zero-
for-zero tariff proposal that negotiators transposed into the overall package of the 
Uruguay Round by reducing tariffs on chemicals to zero on both sides of the Atlantic.
47
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The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing constituted one of the major building 
blocks of the overall package of the Uruguay Round,
48
 and sector-wide peak 
associations from the textiles sector were crucial in securing the agreement. For 
instance, the European sector-wide peak association COMITEXTIL (now EURATEX) 
served as the central interlocutor for European Commission negotiators.
49
 Negotiators 
were hesitant or even refused to interact with representatives of more specialized, 
product-specific organizations, as taking less aggregated demands into account would 
have hindered their potential to bring weight and credibility to their negotiation 
positions. Also on the American side, the large sector-wide peak associations, rather 
than the more specialized, product-specific representatives from American industry 
were the most frequent and prominent to give testimony in hearings before the House 
Committee on Ways and Means. Those arguing in favor of increased foreign market 
access included the American Electronics Association, the Semiconductor Industry 
Association, the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association, and the Motion 
Picture Association of America, whereas those defending the existing level of 
protection worked through cross-sector trade associations like the Labor-Industry 
Coalition for International Trade and the Trade Reform Action Coalition.
50
 Both 
European and American sector-wide organizations thus played a key role in 
constructing the package deal of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
51
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Also during the WTO period, sector-wide and cross-sector lobbying has been 
dominant in the institutional context of multilateral trade negotiations.
52
 Throughout the 
Doha Round, the European Farmers and Agro-Cooperatives Organization (COPA-
COGECA), for example, aggregated demands and preferences from the agricultural 
sector and relayed them to the European Commission. The same was seen with regards 
to other sector-wide trade associations such as the European Services Forum, the 
European Chemical Industry Council, and the European pharmaceuticals peak 
association EFPIA.
53
  
The evidence discussed above shows that interest mobilization in the pre-1995 
and post-1995 periods predominantly took the form of sector-wide and cross-sector 
trade associations taking the stage more consistently and more prominently than more 
specialized carriers of collective action. Quantitative evidence on lobbying presence at 
WTO Ministerial Conferences (MCs) for the post-1995 period lends additional support 
to this claim. To see what type of incentives the MCs provides to interest groups, we 
look at the level of interest aggregation predominant among interest groups that 
attended (or were eligible to attend) sessions of the WTO Ministerial Conference. Our 
dataset includes 1968 organizations registered by the WTO Secretariat as eligible to 
attend and/or as attending one of the seven sessions of the WTO MC between 1996 and 
2012. From this we filtered all EU and US organizations, which left a total of 437 
interest organizations, of which 215 originated from the US and 222 from the EU. 
Using web-based coding we added measures such as geographical origin, areas of 
interest, and organizational characteristics, as well as a measure of the level of interest 
aggregation of lobbying organizations using the ISIC classification system. We used the 
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classification system in order to ensure comparability between our product scope coding 
of dispute settlement cases and interest group presence at sessions of the WTO MC. By 
looking at the nature of collective action at the MCs over time we have, again, an 
indication on the type of incentives this venue provides to interest groups. Figures 2a 
and 2b offer an overview of how the relative share of product-specific and sector-wide 
associations attending sessions of the WTO MC has evolved over time.  
 
Figure 2a – EU interest groups attending WTO MCS  
by level of interest aggregation (percent, 1995-2012) 
 
 
 
Figure 2b – US interest groups attending WTO MCs  
by level of interest aggregation (percent, 1995-2012) 
 
 
 
The figures illustrate the relative dominance of sector-wide interest 
organizations over product-specific ones with multilateral trade negotiations – with 
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some slight, yet noteworthy differences between the EU and the US. The share of 
product-specific interest groups that attends these negotiations never exceeded 40 
percent (at Seattle) in the case of the EU, and the average share of product-specific US 
interest groups present at sessions of the MC was only 44 percent of all US business 
associations attending, arguably a consequence of the more pluralist outlook of the US 
system of interest representation – an effect we have already noted with regard to the 
share of product-specific WTO dispute settlement cases. In total, nonetheless, the 
evidence provides additional support for our assertion that the negotiation forum of the 
WTO provides more incentives for sector-wide and cross-sectoral collective action than 
for specialized forms of collective action.  
 
Comparing institutional venues  
Finally, we combine and re-organize the evidence presented so far to make more 
explicit the important point that the institutional structure of the WTO provides both 
incentives for sector-wide and product-specific trade policy lobbying. If the main 
determinant of the type of political mobilization were to be found only in the type of 
trade countries engage in, we should observe that increases in intra-industry trade 
produces more product-specific lobbying at the expense of sector-wide lobbying, 
regardless of institutional context. We suggest however, that different organizational 
forms of trade lobbying coexist as varying responses to the incentives brought about by 
the dual nature of the international trade regime with a judicial and a negotiation arm. 
Since this co-existence of two distinct lobbying patterns is important both theoretically 
and empirically, we compare the percentage of sector-wide and product-specific interest 
mobilization in the EU and the US in the contexts of WTO dispute settlement and WTO 
MCs in figure 3a and 3b. In both cases we add a polynomial trend line (order 3)
54
 as this 
allows us to locate general patterns of in- or decrease within the data over time. We 
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include the development of intra-industry trade as a reference point (see also figure 1a 
and b).  
 
Figure 3a – EU product-specific mobilization, 
product-specific DS cases, and intra-industry trade 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b – US product-specific mobilization, 
product-specific DS cases, and intra-industry trade 
 
 
 
The results indicate two things. First, patterns of political mobilization differ 
significantly depending on the type of institutional venue targeted. Despite the 
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institutional differences between the EU and US, the international institution of trade 
dispute adjudication attracts much more product-specific interests throughout, whereas 
the international institutional environment of multilateral trade negotiations attracts 
more sector-wide interest mobilization. This difference is most profound for the EU in 
which we find almost a mirror image of mobilization of product-specific and sector-
wide interest mobilization between 1995 and 2011. That is, on average 82 percent of the 
EU cases filed at the WTO DSB were product-specific, whereas at each of the WTO 
MCs, on average, only 24 percent of the EU interest groups represented these more 
narrow interests. For interest organizations from the US, the difference is somewhat 
smaller, but the pattern exhibits the same institutional effect, in which more US product-
specific interest groups mobilized for dispute settlement than sector-wide groups (on 
average 76 to 24 percent), while at the MCs US sector-wide mobilization was more 
pronounced than product-specific mobilization (on average 44 to 56 percent). While 
differences between WTO members suggest additional effects due to domestic 
characteristics, i.e. domestic patterns of interest intermediation and political institutions, 
the figures lend plausibility to the claim that international institutions affect domestic 
lobbying patterns in a systematic way.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have argued that international trade institutions provide 
incentives for different types of domestic interest mobilization. Next to explanations 
that focus on the evolving character of global trade or the impact of domestic 
institutions, we highlight how the characteristics of the institutional structures of the 
multilateral trade regime also affect collective action in trade policymaking. The 
evidence we presented provides substantial support for this reasoning. First, we showed 
that the institutional environment of judicialized dispute settlement created significant 
incentives for product-specific lobbying. Furthermore, the increase in product-specific 
cases filed at the WTO DSM in recent decades cannot be (fully) accounted for by the 
rise of intra-industry trade in the EU and US. Since the early 2000s, the share of intra-
industry trade has stabilized and even decreased in both trading entities, while the 
number of product-specific dispute settlement cases has grown at an even higher speed 
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than in earlier periods. In contrast, interest mobilization in the form of attendance at 
sessions of the WTO Ministerial Conference continues to be marked by sector-wide 
representation. This supports our claim that the judicial system of rule enforcement of 
the WTO creates incentives for product-specific and specialized trade policy lobbying. 
Future research might engage in even more systematic tests of our claim by drawing, if 
it is to become available, on comparable more direct evidence concerning patterns of 
trade policy lobbying.  
Of course, it remains to be seen whether or not the incentives provided by the 
WTO has led to substantial shifts in the type of trade lobbying in the EU and the US. 
Yet, the evidence we presented in this article at the very least shows that we cannot 
ignore the institutional structure of the global trade regime but need to pay attention to 
the potential influence of the institution on collective action.  
Future research could also explore whether the dynamics we have highlighted 
similarly play out for important members of the trade regime other than the EU and the 
US, or for other international organizations that have both a legislative and a judicial 
branch. Our causal reasoning is not likely to be relevant for countries that either do not 
significantly weigh in on negotiations and/or make little use of the WTO DSM. These 
may include, for example, least developed countries (LDCs) and non-democracies 
which have largely state-driven systems of interest intermediation. But future research 
could fruitfully investigate whether the institutional structures of the WTO have 
affected patterns of interest aggregation and representation within other established as 
well as emerging democratic economies. Existing research has already looked into 
emerging patterns of business-government interactions in countries such as India, 
Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa due to their active participation in the WTO 
governance system.
55
 These studies could be very usefully complemented with the 
approach taken in this article.  
The reason why it may be useful to include the potential effect of international 
institutions more into future analyses relates to the possible political consequences. That 
is, our findings bear resemblance to patterns often observed within domestic 
governance, where legislative and rule enforcement institutional settings also affect 
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patterns of political mobilization. However, this parallelism between domestic 
governance and the governance system of the WTO, both characterized by the co-
existence of sector-wide and product-specific lobbying, may not hold for the WTO in 
the future. For some time, it seemed reasonable to assume that the fragmenting effect of 
judicial trade policy making on trade policy lobbying would be countered by the 
increased importance of negotiated trade-related regulations for many, if not all 
economic sectors within the WTO framework. Yet, the multilateral negotiating track is 
vastly diminishing in importance, yielding only very small partial agreements in recent 
years, such as the Bali 2013 agreement on trade facilitation. If this development 
continues, the members of peak associations have little incentive to seek influence on 
WTO negotiations. At the same time, the judicial arm of the WTO has been, and 
continues to be, the most active part of the organization, with its rulings being largely 
respected and considered authoritative. In the long run, all this could reduce the 
presence of sector-wide peak associations regarding trade issues, and change the picture 
that we have portrayed in this article to one in which product-specific interests dominate 
the WTO governance system. 
At the same time, this does not need to mean the end of sector-wide interest 
representation. Partially as a result of the WTO deadlock, contemporary international 
trade governance has increasingly shifted to bilateral, regional, and plurilateral deal 
making. The explanation we have provided for sector-wide interest mobilization in the 
framework of package deal negotiations implies that most of the sector-wide 
articulation of interests may now take place in the negotiation of such bilateral, regional, 
and plurilateral agreements, especially those covering very large amounts of trade, like 
the trans-pacific and transatlantic trade and investment partnerships. Future research 
could explore whether this implication is borne out by empirical evidence. If this is 
found to be the case, the co-existence of product-specific and sector-wide lobbying may 
well turn out to remain a continuing general feature of patterns of interest mobilization 
in international trade governance.  
 
